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PROGRESSIVE FREE SPEECH AND THE
UNEASY CASE FOR CAMPUS HATE CODES
ROBERT

F. NAGEL*

Professor Becker makes a strong argument that the interests
of women, including their free speech interests, would be better
served by less judicial review. I agree with much of what she says
about the limitations of judicial power. In fact, her criticisms are
convincing enough that they may apply with equal-or at least
sufficient-force to the interests of many groups besides women.
I have in mind not only racial minorities but also the mass of
white citizens of both genders. Professor Becker acknowledges that
some disadvantages may exist when judicial interpretations impinge
on the welfare of other groups, but she argues that the problems
are greater with respect to women. Therefore, it is tempting for
me to spend my time here insisting that her analysis applies more
broadly than she believes. This would fulfill my academic obligation to be argumentative, and, moreover, I actually do think that
the people of the United States generally would be better off with
less judicial review. To me it is sad that insights like those in
Professor Becker's paper are so often persuasive only when they
emerge from the prism of interest group ideology.
However, to the relief of those who have heard my views on
judicial review ad nauseam, I will not dwell on this difference
between Professor Becker's position and my own. Instead, I want
to comment on the very interesting points that she makes about
campus "hate codes." What I have to say is not criticism; it is
not even inconsistent with Professor Becker's paper. My observations bear on her argument in this oblique way: The full advantages
of reducing our dependence on judicial review will not be gained
if we only replace one mechanism of intellectual imperialism with
another.
Professor Becker says that universities are places where speech
is (and ought to be) pervasively regulated according to its content
and that restrictions on "hate speech" cannot be distinguished
from any of these other forms of regulation.' Since courts generally
* Rothgerber Professor of Law, University of Colorado
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leave universities free to regulate speech for the sake of educational
purposes, so, too, should they leave universities free to design and
implement "hate codes."
She takes no direct position on whether it would be wise for
a faculty to adopt such codes. Her argument is simply that nonjudicial thinking on this question would likely be better and richer
than the thinking of judges. This naturally invites us to consider
how the advantages of non-judicial decisionmaking would work
out when applied to the issue of "hate codes."
Consider the Wisconsin code referred to in Professor Becker's
paper. Before being enjoined by the local federal judge, this provision applied to ". . . discriminatory comments, epithets or other
expressive behavior directed at an individual . . . if such comments
...intentionally (1) Demean the race, sex, color, creed, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual
... ; and (2) Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education ....
While not asserting that such a rule
should be adopted, she argues, not only that it is indistinguishable
from other academic judgments, but that allowing such rules might
promote democracy by enhancing the status of women and minority group members as members of university communities.
Thus, at least conceivably, academic decisionmakers might be correct in concluding that the Wisconsin code would promote both
the educational and political interests of (among others) women.
It may be true that academics are more likely to reach such
progressive conclusions than are those judges charged with enforcing "conservative free speech" principles.' But suppose that academic decisionmakers wanted to make full use of the opportunities
presented by being outside the judicial system. What does Professor
Becker's discussion suggest about how such people should think
about the issue of hate codes?
One of the most arresting features of Professor Becker's
analysis is her claim that courts are willing to consider constitutional challenges to academic hate codes because these codes are
"visible" content discriminations. 4 They are visible because they
protect "new entrants . . . in nontraditional ways." 5 Thus judges
tend to label as "suppressive" those regulations that actually pro"I

2.
v. Board
3.
4.
5.

Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.-06(2) (June 1989) (enjoined in UWM Post, Inc.
of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis 1991)).
Becker, supra note 1, at 1031.
Id. at 1040-41.
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mote the speech interests of outsiders and minorities while hardly
noticing the many similar regulations that serve the interests of
existing powerful groups within the universities. An academic decisionmaker, of course, would want to avoid this trap. But how?
Perhaps, as Professor Becker suggests, non-judicial decisionmakers will be relatively likely to avoid the problem because they
are a more heterogeneous and politically responsive group than
are federal judges. Even so, the very fact that academics might be
content to label a proposed hate code as an ordinary educational
rule suggests the possibility that the code would serve the interests
of some powerful (perhaps, newly powerful) group. That is, having
satisfied themselves that the code is not suppressive, university
decisionmakers may only have established that it does not threaten
their own interests. This, of course, could mean that the free
speech interests of some other, unobserved out-group might be
threatened by the code.
In fact, it is obvious that the enactment of the code would
itself be an indication that new out-groups exist and are relatively
powerless. Under the Wisconsin code, the new dissenters would
include, for example, religious traditionalists who believe that homosexual behavior is sinful, fervent atheists who believe that religious belief is evil, and cultural conservatives who believe that
(to use Professor Becker's example) "women are by nature better
equipped to be mothers than executives." 6 To some extent, the
unpopular views of such dissenters would be stifled by the existence
and eforcement of the code. More generally, these dissenting
groups would be socially and intellectually marginalized, since their
beliefs would have been officially identified as representing a threat
to the university's objectives.
Now, progressive non-judicial decisionmakers might determine
that the interests of these new out-groups simply must be subordinated. It might be thought, for example, that their beliefs are
so unfounded or so destructive to new entrants as to be out-ofplace in a university. This is, of course, a dangerous judgment
because (as Professor Becker notes in other contexts) there are
free speech considerations on both sides of the issue. Although
civility and respect are certainly important components of any
system of vigorous inquiry and exchange, so also are the variety
and sharpness that outrageous dissent can provide. University de6. Id. at 1038. Note that, according to Becker, the statement would not be subject
to the code if stated once in class.
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cisionmakers might nevertheless conclude that the interests of the
"new entrants" deserved protection, but this judgment would come
reluctantly to anyone suspicious of orthodoxies. The decisionmakers could be fortified by the knowledge that, as Professor Becker
points out, since they are operating outside the judicial forum,
other universities are free to come to different conclusions and all
such determinations are only experimental. 7
But, of course, the issue is not this straightforward. If it were,
there would hardly be need for the relatively ambivalent, speculative, complex discourse that Professor Becker suggests is a potential advantage of non-judicial determinations.
A second major set of complications is that, while it is true
that the protections afforded by the hate code might promote the
self-respect and intellectual vigor of members of the protected
classes, they might also have the opposite effect. Explicit and
official protections might encourage a sense of victimization and
dependence. Moreover, the code might actually increase the "new
entrants' sense of rejection. This would be possible because, by
highlighting the issue of verbal insults, the protections might increase sensitivity to whatever hostility is expressed. It would also
be possible because the new out-groups, being exposed to potential
sanctions, might actually begin to feel more disapproval and animosity towards the protected classes. Even if ill-feelings were not
increased in fact, by inhibiting critical or hostile comments, the
code might create a silence into which the protected groups could
pour their worst fears and suspicions.
A third major complication is that academic decisionmakers
are in no position to define the collective interests of the "new
entrants." In fact, these classes will include some individuals who
will be silenced or marginalized by the code. After all, some women
are traditionalists, some gays are dissatisfied with their orientation,
some blacks oppose affirmative action or integration, and so on.
A self-assured progressive decisionmaker can, of course, deny that
such people exist or that their status and beliefs are worth protecting. But, as Professor Becker notes about the interests of
women, one reason to favor a non-uniform, experimental approach
is that there is no consensus on what kind of world would represent
progress. 8 I would go a step further: there is no reason to assume
that women (or any other class to be protected by hate codes)
7. Id. at 1045.
8. Id. at 991.
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have unified interests. Hence the definition of "progress" for "new
entrants" is not only contested now, it will always be contested
and it will always be in flux. Academic decisionmakers who value
a vigorous intellectual climate would be extremely hesitant to prejudge ultimate questions of self-definition by undervaluing the
beliefs of dissenting members of the "new entrant" groups. These
beliefs may seem wrong today, but they could be vindicated tomorrow. Even if they are never vindicated, dissenting views, of
course, can contribute in useful ways to the modification of currently dominant conceptions of "progress." Black separatists have
had something to teach integrationists. Cultural traditionalists, I
believe, have had an effect on the thinking of some revisionist
feminists.
Thus, even if the academic decisionmaker can justify subordinating the interests of the new out-groups in favor of the "new
entrants," the speech interests of the favored groups may well
argue against the hate code. I do not say that such considerations
are necessarily decisive-they certainly would not apply with equal
force to all hate codes or in all circumstances. But they demonstrate
how perverse and uncertain the matter becomes outside the courts.
It is one thing to say there are advantages to resolving the hate
code issue in a non-judicial forum and another to utilize those
advantages. Little will be gained if the rigidity and small-mindedness that can characterize "conservative" judicial thinking is
replaced by the rigidity and small-mindedness that can characterize
"progressive" academic thinking.

